CFP: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN


Questions regarding children’s moral and political status have received growing attention in the last years. In particular, it has been discussed whether children can be – or should be – seen as bearers of moral rights, and if so, which rights can be appropriately ascribed to them (Griffin 2002; Brennan 2002; Brighouse 2002). It has often been assumed that children should not be granted full autonomy rights or political rights. In recent discussions, however, it has been questioned once again how paternalism towards older children and adolescents can be justified (Anderson/Claassen 2012; Franklin-Hall 2013; Schouten 2018), and on what grounds these groups of persons are denied a right to vote (Clayton 2006). Furthermore, considerable attention has been given to claims regarding ‘child-specific goods’ and the ‘intrinsic value of children’, and the implications of such claims for questions of children’s rights and distributive justice (Mcleod 2002; Brennan 2014; Brighouse/Swift 2014; Gheaus 2017; Hannan 2017).

 

These various issues point to an underlying theme, namely, what a child ‘is’, how childhood is distinguished from adulthood, and what the moral relevance of this distinction is. Moral Philosophy and Politics invites contributions to this general concern and to ongoing and controversial discussions in the ethics of childhood as described above. Suitable contributions may address questions such as:

  •  What is the significance of the terms ‘child’/‘childhood’ and ‘adult’/‘adulthood’ in moral theorising?
  •  Should children be ascribed moral rights? What kinds of rights should children have?
  •  What is the justification – and what are the moral limits – of paternalism towards children and adolescents??
  •  How should we conceive of children’s political status? Should children have a right to vote?
  •  Are some goods only valuable for children, and not for adults? Is childhood valuable in itself, or only as a preparation for adulthood?
  •  What are the normative implications of views about the value of childhood for debates about, e.g., distributive justice or our moral duties towards children?

Papers should be submitted before November 30, 2018 and should generally not exceed 8000 words; shorter articles will also be accepted for review.

 

All submissions will undergo MOPP’s double-blind refereeing process.

 

Please note that this process is not organized by the guest editors but by the journal’s founding editors who will also have the final word on publication decisions.

 

The journal’s manuscript submission site can accessed here: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mopp

 

Guest Editors:

Holger Baumann & Johannes Giesinger (Zurich University)

 


CFP: TOWARDS FOOLPROOF DEMOCRACY: ADVANCING PUBLIC DEBATE AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING


The events of the year 2016 have led many critical observers to doubt the stability and longevity of democracy. Ideally, democracy effectuates the rule of reason. Debates in elected assemblies and in society as a whole should serve the process of finding best reasons for political decisions. However, the mechanisms that currently produce such decisions are vulnerable to misuse. Arguably, they need to be redesigned in an attempt to make them “foolproof” - i.e., to design them in a way to make misuse inherently impossible or to minimize its negative consequences.

 

Empirical evidence suggests that political agents may generally lack the required competence for deliberation and debate. Even very intelligent people systematically tend to focus on information that confirms what they already believe and dismiss information that contradicts it. Instead of seeking rational debate, people often cling to forms of modern tribalism. In addition, modern communication networks are swiftly replacing traditional print and broadcast news media. This shift presents deliberative democracy with opportunities but also risks, as these communication networks neither encourage a balanced exchange of information nor systematically check its quality.

 

In view of these developments, the question of the desired relation between democracy, deliberation, and truth looms large. Moral Philosophy and Politics invites contributions that seek to articulate this relation from the viewpoint of philosophy and political science. Suitable contributions may address such questions as:

  • How, if at all, can we improve public opinion formation?
  • Is deliberation the best way to generate political decisions in modern democracy?
  • How can we make democracy more resistant to populism and other forms of mass manipulation? Should politics be allowed (and perhaps even obligated) to exert influence on opinion formation in society?
  • Is there a way to methodically and impartially check the quality of debate in the public sphere?
  • Are political polarization and “echo chambers” a problem for democracy? And, if so, how can we guard against their formation and maintenance?
  • What ought to be the role of science and the humanities in the democratic process?

 

Papers should be submitted before (NEW DEADLINE) SEPTEMBER 30, 2018 and should generally not exceed 8000 words; shorter articles will also be accepted for review.

 

All submissions will undergo MOPP’s double-blind refereeing process.

Please note that this process is not organized by the guest editors but by the journal’s founding editors who will also have the final word on publication decisions.

  

The journal’s manuscript submission site can accessed here: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mopp

 

Guest editors:

David Lanius (Karlsruhe)

Ioannis Votsis (London)

 


CFP: DEMANDINGNESS IN PRACTICE: THE LIMITS OF MORAL OBLIGATIONS IN SOCIAL, POLITICAL, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXTS


Moral Philosophy and Politics invites contributions to a special issue focusing on problems of demandingness and overdemandingness in practical ethics.

 

Demandingness and overdemandingness are primarily discussed in the context of metaethical objections to moral theories. But the idea that particular moral obligations can be deferred by reference to their excessiveness is also relevant to quite a number of debates in practical ethics. It is plainly not self-evident or deducible from a general principle that — and at what point — moral obligation reaches its limits, say, when it comes to the demand to reduce one’s carbon footprint, to pay for the pensions of the young, to donate a liver, to risk one’s job or more over whistleblowing, to testify against a loved one, or even share one’s apartment with a stranger in need. The variety of these problems across different practical domains call for a reflection on the limits moral demands in terms of individual — and possibly also collective— (over-)demandingness: a reflection on real life problems that bridges the concern of metaethical, normative reflection with practical ethics.

 

The special issue on „Demandingness in Practice — The Limits of Moral Obligations in Social, Political, Legal and Economic Contexts“ aims at unfolding a fine-grained picture of demandingness-objections in practical ethics, and thus at linking the meta-ethical debate with concrete ethical problems that deserve more detailed and often interdisciplinary studies. Submissions for the special issue may be dealing with questions such as:

  • In which particular fields (law, economics, ecology, personal relations, etc.) do problems of demandingness appear? How do these contexts differ from each other?
  • Which social or legal norms can be understood to pose limits to individual obligations by reference to demandingness?
  • Does the metaethical debate on demandingness adequately represent widespread intuitions about the phenomenon in common morality?
  • How are conventional limits regarding the demands on agents related to the moral debate on demandingness?
  • Is demandingness a socially and politically relative notion? 
  • Can excessive demands on individuals be compared to excessive demands on groups or collectives?
  • Is the debate on the demandingness of ethical theories (to be) linked to the debate on ideal and non-ideal theories in political philosophy? 

 

Papers should be submitted before (NEW DEADLINE!) SEPTEMBER 15, 2018 and should generally not exceed 8000 words; shorter articles will also be accepted for review. 

 

All submissions will undergo double-blind refereeing. 

Note that the refereeing process of MOPP is not organized by the guest editors but by the journal’s founding editors who will also make the final decision on publication.

 

The journal’s manuscript submission site is: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mopp

  

Guest editors:

Marcel van Ackeren  (Oxford) 

Simon Derpmann (Münster)